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The Great Recession was preceded by a protracted period of high 
growth accompanied by low and stable inflation. Both factors 
were widely interpreted as signs that the growth was based on 
sound economic fundamentals. However, in that period, the indi-
cators of internal and external imbalances such as current ac-
count deficits and private-sector borrowing needs experienced 
sharp increases in many countries, and were considerably up on 
their historical averages. Although warnings were issued in various 
quarters about the risks associated with these imbalances,1 the 
overriding perception was that the high growth rates would con-
tinue over time, which was reflected in the gradual increase in the 
estimated potential growth rate.
In principle, potential growth is identified with a growth rate that 
an economy is capable of sustaining with its production factors. 
Usually, potential growth – and the corresponding output gap – is 
estimated as output growth compatible with stable inflation, in 
keeping with the notion of the Phillips curve and the concept of 
the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
Consequently, in the habitual potential growth estimate the only 
imbalance considered is related to unemployment which takes 
the form of inflationary pressures. However, for various reasons – 
including the credibility gained by central banks in their ability to 
maintain price stability and the globalisation of economic activity 
– in recent years inflation has become less closely related to fluc-
tuations in developed economies’ activity than in the past as 
shown in Panel 1. Furthermore, inflation seems to have decou-
pled from other indicators of external imbalances – such as a very 
high current account deficit – and of internal imbalances – accel-
erated growth of credit or of asset prices – with the result that 
inflation is no longer a sufficient synthesis of other imbalances in 
the economy.
The limitations of the potential output methodology for adequately 
approximating the growth that an economy is capable of sustain-
ing are illustrated by certain stylised facts. First, real time potential 
growth estimates show a significant relationship with various 
measures of external imbalances (such as the current account bal-
ance) and of internal imbalances (for example, with residential in-
vestment and private-sector borrowing needs), particularly in the 
last decade and they are subject to considerable revisions ex-
post. Second, the potential growth estimates tend to increase 
when imbalances are generated and to decrease when they are 
corrected. Panel 2 shows changes in the current account balances 
and estimated potential growth, whereas Panel 3 shows the cor-
relation between the two and the correlation of other imbalances 
with estimated potential growth, a correlation which is significant 
in all cases in the pre-crisis years.
These considerations indicate the appropriateness of developing 
growth indicators that take into account the relevant imbalances 
which have built up. In this vein, an alternative concept of growth 
adjusted for imbalances, similarly to that of habitual potential 
growth, is defined as the GDP growth rate which does not widen 
or generate macroeconomic imbalances, identified in this case 
through a broad set of indicators and not only inflation. The mac-
roeconomic imbalances considered include the current account 
balance, the real effective exchange rate and the international in-
vestment position as external imbalances, and public and private-
sector saving and investment, public and private-sector balances, 
residential investment and the weight of the non-tradable sector 
as internal imbalances.2
The exercise is performed for certain countries which had high 
external and private-sector borrowing needs prior to the crisis 
(United States, United Kingdom and Spain) and for others in the 
opposite situation (Germany and China), between 1970 and 2011. 
The results of this approach confirm, on one hand, the significance 
of external and of institutional sectors’ balances as indicators of 
imbalances and, on the other, the greater stability of growth esti-
mates adjusted for imbalances with respect to potential growth 
estimates. The most important imbalance indicators are the cur-
rent account balance and private-sector financing needs, and, in 
certain cases, public-sector ones. The resulting estimates of ad-
justed growth are not correlated to the imbalance indicators and 
consequently, it could be expected that they are subject to lower 
ex-post revisions than potential growth ones. However, this ap-
proach is not free from limitations either and, hence, the results 
should be interpreted with caution.
Among the results by group of countries, the growth estimates 
adjusted for imbalances for countries with borrowing needs are 
lower than the pre-crisis estimates of potential growth, resulting 
in positive output gaps estimated for that period which are sub-
stantially higher, as seen in Panel 4. Conversely, growth adjust-
ed for imbalances declines to a lesser degree than potential 
growth after the adjustment for external imbalances has been 
made, as has occurred in most of these countries in the wake of 
the crisis.
In short, the crisis – its precedents, origin and development – 
has revealed the limitations of the potential growth methodology 
for evaluating the capacity for growing sustainedly and the ap-
propriateness of incorporating a wider set of imbalances into the 
analysis and assessment of the cyclical position of the economy, 
BOX 3.1GROWTH AND ECONOMIC IMBALANCES
1  For instance, the IMF and Bank for International Settlements repeatedly 
underlined that global financial imbalances represented a risk to the 
continuity of world growth and vast literature, based on emerging econ-
omies, demonstrated that the build-up of imbalances usually led to a 
crisis. In-house, other papers showed that the imbalances built up by 
the Spanish economy and its long-term growth outlook were incompat-
ible. See Campa and Gavilán (2006), Current accounts in the Euro area: 
an intertemporal approach, Documentos de Trabajo, No. 0638, Banco 
de España, and Estrada, Jimeno and Malo de Molina (2009), The Span-
ish economy in EMU: the first ten years, Documentos Ocasionales, No. 
0901, Banco de España.
2  For more details see Alberola, Estrada and Santabárbara (2013), Growth 
Beyond Imbalances. Sustainable Growth Rates and Output Gap Reas-
sessment, Banco de España, mimeo.
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understood in a broader sense than the business cycle. The de-
velopment of alternative indicators is a useful device for improv-
ing economic policy design, both in the more traditional area of 
cyclical stabilisation – monetary and fiscal policies – and in the 
area of other broader policies, such as macroprudential or struc-
tural policies.
BOX 3.1GROWTH AND ECONOMIC IMBALANCES (cont’d)
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PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE UNITED STATES: SITUATION, OUTLOOK AND ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES BOX 3.2
US public finances must address in the medium term the process 
of an ageing population and the resulting increase in spending on 
welfare. Additionally, the sharp deterioration of the public balance 
in the wake of the crisis has brought to the fore the need to provide 
a lasting solution to this problem. Although this situation is shared, 
even much more pressingly, with other advanced economies, the 
political polarisation surrounding this issue makes it particularly im-
portant in the US case.
While the fiscal structure of the United States is relatively decentralised 
in territorial terms,1 the analysis of public finances at the federal level 
provides a suitable proxy to this matter. Primary public spending of the 
federal government can be divided into a discretionary component, 
which includes defence and non-defence spending and must be ap-
proved annually by Congress, and a mandatory component linked 
to the Social Security programmes, Medicare – healthcare coverage for 
the elderly – and Medicaid – for individuals with low income and re-
sources or with certain disabilities – among others. In order to change 
these programmes the law must be specifically amended or repealed. 
The third component of federal public spending is interest payments, 
which in 2012 represented 1.4% of GDP (considerably below the aver-
age of recent decades), since although public debt is at a peak since 
the Second World War, the interest rate remains at a historical low.
As shown in Panel 1, in the last four decades, mandatory spend-
ing has increased from 28% to 63%, as a percentage of the 
federal government’s primary public spending, as a result of de-
mographic trends and the increase in spending on health. Con-
versely, the weight of the discretionary component has declined, 
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1  In 2012, federal government spending (22.8% of GDP) accounted for 
around 58% of total public spending; state and local government spend-
ing accounted for the remaining 42%.
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BOX 3.2PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE UNITED STATES: SITUATION, OUTLOOK AND ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES (cont’d)
not only in terms of federal public spending but also as a percent-
age of GDP and is expected to continue to do so in the future. The 
baseline scenarios projected under the assumption that current 
legislation remains the same, which take into account the retire-
ment of the baby-boomers, the increase in life expectancy and the 
rise in spending on health at higher rates than that of GDP – despite 
the improvement in recent years – indicate that mandatory spend-
ing would increase from around 10.5% of GDP in 2012 to approxi-
mately 16.5% in 25 years (see Panel 2)2 and to almost 20% within 
50 years3.
Although these exercises are subject to notable uncertainty – as-
sociated with healthcare spending, migratory flows and economic 
conditions – the magnitude of the problem is included in the pro-
jections of rising budget deficits, despite the gradual decrease 
expected in discretionary spending. The foregoing, together with 
growing interest payments would lead government debt held by 
the public onto an upward path (see Panel 3). Consequently, since 
the room for manoeuvre in discretionary spending is becoming 
smaller and smaller, projected budget deficits can only be miti-
gated by legislative changes reducing welfare benefits or increas-
ing revenue, which in the United Sates are lower than in other de-
veloped countries4. Accordingly, numerous, notably different, pro-
posals have been presented in recent years with very different 
redistributive effects and which ultimately reflect the opposing 
views on the role that the public sector should play in the econo-
my. In their extreme versions, these views can generally be identi-
fied with the positions of each of the two major political parties. 
These differences encapsulate the difficulty of controlling public 
debt in the medium term.
At the beginning of the millennium, these problems in public fi-
nances did not seem imminent (see Panel 4) and debate was fo-
cused on the allocation of the projected budget surpluses. In that 
context, temporary tax cuts were adopted (that were passed in 
2001 and 2003, and should have ended in 2010) and there was a 
change in Medicare (in 2003), which included a programme to 
subsidise drugs. These regulatory amendments together with the 
rise in discretionary military spending in Afghanistan and Iraq, led 
to substantial changes in the projections of the federal govern-
ment’s budget balance and debt (see Panel 3). Furthermore, the 
crisis and the economic policy decisions adopted to tackle it led to 
even more important changes in the fiscal outlook after 2008. The 
large budget deficits recorded, at close to 10% between 2009 and 
2011 (see Panel 4) – the highest levels since the Second World 
War, contributed to doubling public debt in terms of GDP to 72.5% 
between 2007 and 2012, whereas before the beginning of the cri-
sis it was projected to stand at 37% of GDP in 2012.
The extreme political polarisation of recent years has prevented 
the conclusion of a bipartisan agreement to establish a path of 
fiscal consolidation and has given rise to a succession of crises 
and partial temporary solutions with negative effects on financial 
markets. Thus, in the debt ceiling crisis of summer 2011 the Budg-
et Control Act (BCA) was approved. This introduced public spend-
ing cuts in the subsequent ten years, setting limits on the growth 
of discretionary spending, and the creation of a bipartisan con-
gressional committee (known as the “Super Committee”), that had 
to propose a plan to reduce government deficits in the same pe-
riod. If an agreement was not reached by this committe, as in fact 
happened, the law envisaged sequestration, a mechanism of au-
tomatic discretionary spending cuts for the period 2013-2021, 
which was activated in March 2013. Also, on 1 January the Amer-
ican Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) was approved within the deadline 
thereby avoiding the so-called “fiscal cliff”5. The tax cuts approved 
at the beginning of the last decade, which had been extended un-
til the end of 2012 as part of the stimulus plan, were consolidated 
by this legislation for most of the population.
High and rising public debt such as that projected for the United 
States has serious adverse consequences. The first consequence is 
the growing weight of debt servicing, a problem which has currently 
been eased considerably because the backdrop of high risk aversion, 
that makes government debt a safe-haven asset, and monetary poli-
cy actions maintain interest rates at historical lows. Additionally, the 
crowding out effect on private investment and the notable reduction 
in the capacity to respond to negative shocks should be mentioned 
as negative consequences of high and rising public debt. It does not 
seem likely, however, that in a short-term horizon there will be a loss 
of investor confidence in US government debt, which would make 
refinancing difficult and would substantially raise its rates at issue. 
The fact that there has never been a default in the country’s history, 
the dollar’s unique status as a global reserve currency and the con-
sideration of US government debt as the safe-haven asset par excel-
lence suggest that the thresholds of the government debt to GDP 
ratios usually considered as the triggers of a fiscal crisis are higher in 
the US case. These circumstances buy the United States some time 
to take a series of unavoidable crucial decisions, although the prevail-
ing political circumstances are not very conducive to a rapid solution.
2  The projections from 2013 onwards are made by an independent agen-
cy, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) under the Extended Alterna-
tive Fiscal Scenario, which includes the assumption that the policies in 
place in the past but scheduled to expire will be extended in the future. 
For more details see http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43288.
3  For an international comparison of the projected increase in spending on 
pensions and healthcare, see Chart 2.4 (“Increase in Entitlement Spend-
ing, 2011-2030”), in the April 2013 edition of the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor. 
This chart underlines the expected increase in US healthcare spending 
of more than five points of GDP until 2030.
4  See Statistical Table 3 of the April 2013 edition of the IMF’s Fiscal Moni-
tor for a comparison with other advanced economies.
5  The term “fiscal cliff” was coined to refer to the sharp fiscal adjustment 
envisaged in the absence of an agreement by the two main parties on 31 
December 2012. This was the result of a series of temporary stimulus 
packages and tax cuts (approved over the last ten years) expiring auto-
matically and the implementation of the automatic reduction in public 
spending (sequestration) established in the Budget Control Act of 2011.
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Financial integration is a basic pillar of the common monetary 
policy because it permits an effective and uniform transmission of 
the loosening or tightening effect of the central bank’s decisions 
on economic activity to all Member States. When financial markets 
are integrated, the location of economic agents is no longer a de-
termining factor in the terms of access to financing. In the euro 
area, although retail banking activity has remained mostly con-
fined within national borders and their cross-border presence has 
been very limited, the integration that had been achieved in inter-
bank and debt markets was sufficient to ensure, before the crisis, 
a uniform transmission of the monetary policy stance to the cost 
of borrowing for households, firms, general government and finan-
cial intermediaries throughout the area.
The financial crisis has introduced an essential change in this situ-
ation since it has triggered a pronounced fragmentation of the 
euro area’s financial system and has jeopardised the uniqueness 
of monetary policy. In its initial phase, the crisis affected a funda-
mental channel for the transmission of monetary policy impulses: 
the interbank markets which lost their capacity to intermediate li-
quidity within the euro area. The unconventional measures de-
ployed by the ECB through the provision of ample liquidity led it to 
replace this function of intermediation and to ease the possible 
tightening effects on the credit supply.
The unfolding of the crisis and its transformation in 2010 into a 
sovereign debt crisis stepped up the process of market segmenta-
tion which, once triggered, created a feed-back loop as a result of 
sovereign risks, bank risks and economic developments at na-
tional level becoming increasingly interconnected (see Panel 1). 
The issuer’s nationality became an essential determinant in the 
cost and terms of access to financing.
BOX 4.1SINGLE MONETARY POLICY AND DIVERGENCES IN NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
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The heterogeneity of the cost of financing across the euro area 
partly reflected genuine differences in credit risk levels. However, 
the interest rate spreads reached considerably higher levels than 
could be determined by economic fundamentals [see, for exam-
ple, the evidence of the IMF (2012)1 and D’Agostino and Ehrman 
(2013)2 in the case of sovereign debt]. Underlying that, was a crisis 
of confidence in the euro in which scenarios of the monetary area 
breaking up were even considered and which conditioned the be-
haviour of international investors.
All these circumstances prevented a homogeneous transmis-
sion of monetary policy impulses through the interest rate chan-
nel. As shown in Panels 2 and 3, for example, the reduction of 
official interest rates by 75 bp between December 2011 and July 
2012 fed through in full to the interest rates of new loan con-
tracts in the group of countries least exposed to the financial 
strains. By contrast, in Italy, the cost of bank loans, irrespective 
of their purpose, increased, as also occurred in Spain in the 
case of consumer financing and loans to a sub-sector of non-
financial corporations. It is precisely in the area of corporate 
lending where the divergences in the cost of financing are great-
est, as seen in Panel 4. These divergences are especially impor-
tant in the case of smaller loans since most of them are to SMEs 
which, unlike large corporations, do not have alternative chan-
nels of external financing.
The authorities’ response (and, in particular, the introduction by 
the ECB of additional measures such as the OMT programme) 
made it possible to rein in and partially correct the trends towards 
financial fragmentation in the euro area from mid-2012. Recover-
ing a sufficient degree of financial integration is essential for re-
storing the proper functioning of monetary policy transmission 
channels. That requires progress on very diverse fronts which, ul-
timately, permit the euro area to advance towards a genuine eco-
nomic union.
BOX 4.1SINGLE MONETARY POLICY AND DIVERGENCES IN NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (cont’d)
1  Global Financial Stability Report, October 2012, Box 2.2, “Why Are Euro 
Area Periphery Sovereign Spreads So High?”.
2  The Pricing of G7 Sovereign Bond Spreads: The Times, They Are A-
Changin, ECB Working Paper No. 1520, March 2013.
BOX 4.2THE DOWNWARD STICKINESS OF INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 ANNUAL REPORT, 2012 BOX 4.2
Throughout the crisis, and despite the high degree of slack in the 
economy, euro area inflation has evidenced notable downward 
stickiness. This was particularly the case in 2011 and 2012, when 
for many months inflation exceeded 2.5%, driven not only by 
dearer commodities and the rise in certain indirect taxes, but also 
by price rises in the other components. More recently, the growth 
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a ?????????? ????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
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THE DOWNWARD STICKINESS OF INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
rate of the HICP has moved onto a declining course, owing es-
sentially to the behaviour of the more volatile components, al-
though the contribution of inflation excluding energy and taxes 
has not fallen back (see Panel 1).
The scant response by the pace of prices in recent years is in 
contrast to the previous recession, when modest increases in un-
employment were accompanied by sizeable reductions in inflation 
(see Panel 2). This reluctance of inflation to fall can also be seen 
when a comparison is made with inflation estimated using a neo-
Keynesian Phillips curve, which relates the behaviour of prices to 
inflation expectations and the economy’s degree of slack, and 
which predicts, from end-2010, increases in prices lower than 
those observed (see Panel 3). Along these same lines are recent 
studies that have estimated Phillips curves with time-variant pa-
rameters, concluding that the inflation response to changes in cy-
clical unemployment and to expectations has diminished gradu-
ally in recent decades, especially in the advanced economies (i.e. 
they detect a flattening of the Phillips curve1).
There are three leading reasons that may help explain this result: 
uncertainty over the level of slack in the economy; the significance 
of nominal price and wage rigidities; and the adoption of clearly 
defined price stability objectives and the credibility of the devel-
oped economies’ central banks.
Firstly, mention should be made of the sizeable methodological 
discrepancy surrounding the measurements drawn up by interna-
tional organisations on the degree of slack in the euro area econo-
my, at a time of great uncertainty such as the present (see Panel 6). 
Hence, a lower level of slack, as a result of a lower estimate of 
potential growth, would help us understand why the downward 
pressures on prices have been low. The possible structural nature 
of the increase in unemployment in this crisis, the increase in cap-
ital costs and agents’ greater risk aversion may be some of the 
factors justifying a level of potential growth in the euro area lower 
than that estimated by international organisations and agencies 
(see Panel 4). But, in turn, in a more globalised environment, infla-
tion developments in the euro area appear to respond increasingly 
to global determinants, which might help explain their lesser sen-
sitivity to domestic factors.
Secondly, the scant adjustment of prices and wages to changes 
in the levels of economic slack, known as “nominal rigidities”, 
might also help explain the downward stickiness of inflation in a 
setting such as the present. Drawing on the decomposition of the 
GDP deflator, it can be seen that, since the onset of the crisis, 
there have been substantial changes in the contribution of pro-
ductivity and of the gross operating surplus, whereas the contri-
bution of compensation per employee has trended much more 
steadily (see Panel 5). This behaviour by wages, which might be 
attributable to the presence of nominal rigidities, would help ex-
plain the downward stickiness of euro area core inflation. This 
result is consistent with recent microeconomic evidence, which 
suggests that wage cuts were infrequent in the euro area at the 
onset of the crisis.2
Finally, the firm anchoring of inflation expectations as a conse-
quence of the improved credibility of monetary institutions in the 
advanced economies might have contributed to the stability of in-
flation in recent years and to a lesser response by it to changes in 
the business cycle. In this situation, economic agents perceive that 
inflation will hold in the medium term within the target range set by 
the monetary institution; accordingly, they will have fewer incen-
tives to alter prices and wages. In the case of the euro area, the 
habitual indicators tend to confirm this more entrenched anchoring 
of expectations (see Panel 6), while the less volatile components of 
inflation have tended to stabilise at levels relatively compatible with 
the definition of price stability governing ECB conduct.
1  See World Economic Outlook (2012), The dog that didn’t bark: Has infla-
tion been muzzled or was it just sleeping?, International Monetary Fund, 
chapter 3.
2  See Messina and Rõõm (2010), Downward Wage Rigidity during the 
Economic Crisis, Wage Dynamics Network (ECB), mimeo.
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The Spanish general government sector is immersed in what is an 
unprecedented fiscal consolidation drive in our country. The pro-
cess has enabled the budget deficit to be cut from 11.2% in 2009 
to 7% in 2012 (10.6% if the impact of the support to the financial 
sector is included). Despite the adjustment made, the public debt/
GDP ratio continued increasing, rising to 84.2% of GDP in 2012. 
This behaviour was habitual in larger-scale consolidation episodes 
observed in the past in the OECD.1
The fiscal adjustment is unfolding in a highly adverse macroeco-
nomic environment, with very low or negative economic growth 
(which is most singularly affecting national demand), a high rise in 
unemployment and, following the onset of the euro area sover-
eign debt crisis, a significant increase in the cost of government 
debt issues. Against this backdrop, the reduction in the nominal 
budget deficit as a percentage of GDP does not properly reflect 
the consolidation drive undertaken. To better approximate this 
drive, resort is habitually had to measuring it on the basis of the 
change in the structural primary budget balance. This variable ad-
justs for the impact of the business cycle on public finances and 
strips out the effect of changes in the interest burden and of tem-
porary measures, such as public support to the financial sector. 
According to this measure, the fiscal effort is estimated to have 
exceeded 6 pp of GDP between 2009 and 2012 (see Panel 1), in 
contrast to the actual reduction in the budget deficit of only 0.5 pp 
of GDP over the same period.2
Arguably, moreover, the foregoing measure does not reflect the 
impact of an aspect that is proving particularly significant in 
Spain: an economic growth composition that is especially “poor” 
in terms of public revenue-generation, given that the only dynam-
ic factor stems from exports, while national demand continues to 
undergo heavy reductions. Indeed, the habitual calculations of 
the impact of the business cycle on public finances are based on 
the estimation of the cyclical budget balance through the applica-
tion of output gap elasticities of public revenue (which are as-
sumed to be constant over the course of the cycle). This effect 
may be approximated by drawing on the analysis of the residuals 
of the equations for the various public revenue items, defined as 
that part of their trend that cannot be explained by GDP growth 
and the effect of the different discretionary tax measures applied. 
Panel 2 plots the course of these residuals in Spain’s case over 
the period 1998-2012. It can be seen how, in the economic upturn 
prior to the current crisis, these residuals were constantly positive 
and on a high scale, which is associated, at least in part, with the 
positive impact on revenue-raising of the real estate boom and, in 
general, of the strong growth in assets prices and in corporate 
profits. From 2007, however, the estimated residuals turned neg-
ative, a development related, among other factors, to the decline 
in domestic demand and, in particular, to the adjustment ob-
served in the real estate sector, as well as to the reduction in com-
panies’ profits. In quantitative terms, the positive residuals accu-
mulated during the expansionary phase stood at around 6 pp of 
GDP between 1995 and 2007, whereas from 2008 their negative 
cumulative amount would be 5.3 pp of GDP (around 1 pp be-
tween 2010 and 2012).
A complementary means of illustrating the impact of the current 
macroeconomic conditions on fiscal consolidation is through 
the breakdown of the changes in the public debt ratio into its 
main determinants (budget deficit, nominal GDP, interest burden 
and stock-flow adjustments) and comparison with what hap-
pened in other budgetary adjustment processes. To this end, 
Panels 3 and 4 compare the consolidation undertaken in Spain 
in the 1990s with that currently taking place. Specifically, for the 
1990s episode, the trajectory of the public debt ratio is depicted 
between 1993, the year in which the budget deficit peaked 
(7.5% of GDP), and 1998, when it stood at 3% of GDP. As to the 
current consolidation process, and so as to enable a uniform 
comparison, a simulation is made assuming that the deficit-re-
duction period that began in 2009 (with a maximum imbalance 
of 11.2% of GDP) extends to 2013 and 2014, assuming on one 
hand a deficit of 4.5% in 2013 and a 2.8% in 2014, and, on the 
other, that nominal GDP will trend over this period as forecast in 
the Banco de España March 2013 “Spanish Economic Projec-
tions Report”3, adjusted automatically by the impact of the dif-
ferences between the fiscal forecasts incorporated into this re-
port and that simulated here.4
Panel 3 shows there was a reduction in the deficit of 4.5 pp of GDP 
in the 1993-1998 period. This was enough to stabilise the public 
debt/GDP ratio and to set it on a declining course. As can be seen 
in Panel 4, public debt increased by 5 pp of GDP over the period, 
with a positive contribution resulting from the accumulation of 
budget deficits of 26 pp, which was offset by a downward effect of 
21 pp stemming from nominal GDP growth, which ran at an aver-
age rate of 7.2% in that period, while the deficit/debt adjustments, 
which include – among other factors – the change in financial as-
sets, made a zero contribution to the increase in debt. It should be 
borne in mind, moreover, that a privatisation programme for public 
corporations was pursued at that time, allowing revenue for almost 
6 pp of GDP to be raised, and that the ongoing deficit reduction 
was also assisted by a slight decline in the interest burden of close 
BOX 5.1THE SCALE OF THE FISCAL CONSOLIDATION DRIVE IN SPAIN
1  See H. Blöchliger, D. Song and D. Sutherland (2012), Fiscal Consolida-
tion: Part 4. Case Studies of Large Fiscal Consolidation Episodes, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers 935, OECD.
2  In this calculation, only the support to the financial sector has been 
taken as a temporary measure. However, some of the measures adopt-
ed in 2012, e.g. the suspension of the extra December payment for 
public-sector employees, have in principle been defined as temporary. 
If this temporariness were confirmed, or the measures were not re-
placed by others of an equivalent magnitude, the structural deficit-re-
duction effort in 2012 would be below the level of 3 pp of GDP included 
in Panel 1.
3  Banco de España Economic Bulletin, March 2013.
4  Indeed, according to the “Spanish Economic Projections Report”, the 
budget deficit would stand at 6% and 5.9%, respectively. In the simula-
tion exercise presented in this box a (downward) adjustment has been 
made to economic growth derived from the greater fiscal consolidation 
that would be had meeting the deficit targets of 4.5% and 2.8%, respec-
tively, applying a multiplier of 0.5. Further, the implied interest rate on 
public debt is assumed to hold at its 2012 level.
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to 0.3 pp and, more significantly, in unemployment benefits, of 
1.8 pp of GDP.5
In the case of the current consolidation process, and under the 
simulation made, there would be a reduction in the budget deficit 
of 8.4 pp of GDP from 2009 to 2014, which would not be capable 
of stabilising the public debt/GDP ratio over the period.6 Specifi-
cally, the public debt ratio would increase by 40 pp as a result of 
the budget deficits accumulated (36 pp of GDP) and a likewise 
BOX 5.1THE SCALE OF THE FISCAL CONSOLIDATION DRIVE IN SPAIN (cont’d)
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España. 
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5  The first half of the 1990s saw regulatory changes that tightened benefit-
eligibility requirements in respect both of contributory and assistance 
benefits, which was conducive to the decline in unemployment benefits 
during the period.
6  At the start of each of the two sub-periods analysed, the public debt/
GDP ratio was higher in 1993 (59%) than in 2009 (54%). However, the 
budget deficit stood at 7.5% of GDP in 1993, significantly below the 
figure in 2009 (11.2%).
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positive contribution of nominal GDP, given its weak growth, and of 
the deficit/debt adjustment of close to 1 pp and 2 pp of GDP, re-
spectively.7 The interest burden would increase by close to 2 pp of 
GDP and, given the projected course of the unemployment rate, a 
significant reduction is not to be expected in unemployment ben-
efits over the period.
In sum, it may be concluded from the foregoing analysis that the 
required fiscal adjustment to stabilise the public debt/GDP ratio 
in the current consolidation process must be on a sizable scale, 
since the prevailing macroeconomic background is particularly 
adverse.
BOX 5.1THE SCALE OF THE FISCAL CONSOLIDATION DRIVE IN SPAIN (cont’d)
7  A positive contribution of the deficit/debt adjustment to the increase in 
the public debt/GDP ratio of 0.5% in 2013 and 2014 is assumed, similar 
to the annual average observed in the past 10 years.
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During the last upturn, the Spanish household saving rate re-
mained stable, fluctuating moderately around values close to 11% 
of gross disposable income (see Panel 1). The onset of the crisis, 
however, notably altered the pattern of the household saving rate, 
which increased by 7.4 pp from 2008 to 2009 up to 17.8% of 
household income. This rise, which was also seen in other periph-
eral European economies, such as Portugal and Ireland, gave way 
from 2010 to a greater moderation in the Spanish household sav-
ing rate than that seen in other European economies. Specifically, 
at end-2012, the Spanish saving rate had fallen by 10 pp from its 
2009 level, down to 8.2% of gross disposable income.
This irregular behaviour of the saving rate is indicative of the fact 
that some of the determinants of Spanish household consumption 
and saving decisions have exerted an effect of changing intensity 
and direction during the crisis. Among these determinants are two 
whose dynamics over the course of these years are particularly 
significant when it comes to explaining the fluctuations in the sav-
ing rate and projecting its future trajectory: household disposable 
income, and the sensitivity of consumption to changes in house-
holds’ real spending capacity.
Panel 2 tracks income and its breakdown into consumption and 
saving. Of note, first, is the fact that, in the period from 2008-2009, 
nominal household income continued to increase, despite the im-
pact of the financial and economic crisis. A particular contributing 
factor here was the positive sign of income from general govern-
ment, through the dual channel of the effect of the automatic sta-
bilisers and of certain discretionary tax measures adopted in 2008 
which, overall, countered the negative contribution of employee 
compensation. This rise in nominal income was essentially as-
signed to increasing saving, a development that was particularly 
noticeable during 2009 when nominal consumer spending fell. The 
strong pace of the downturn in the labour market and, in general, 
the high aggregate uncertainty that began to become evident in 
the final stretch of 2008 would account for a substantial portion of 
the increase in the precautionary saving rate.
From 2010, household income began to diminish under the weight 
of the continuing forceful job destruction and the onset of fiscal 
consolidation. Since then, declines in income have been accom-
panied by sharp falls in funds earmarked for saving and, on the 
contrary, by increases in household nominal consumption (see 
Panel 2) which, however, have not sufficed to prevent the declines 
in real consumption since early 2011. The fact that the weakness 
of the labour market and, therefore, the uncertainty over future 
wage income are not clearly lower in this latest phase of the crisis 
than in its early stages indicates that, although the precautionary 
reasons that drove saving in 2008 and 2009 have not receded, 
some other factor operating in the opposite direction has prevailed 
since 2010, exerting a negative effect on saving.
An initial factor to be taken into account in this respect concerns 
the role of saving as a stabilising factor of consumption over time. 
Insofar as agents assess positively a stable consumption path 
over time, the natural response to negative temporary shocks in 
their income and wealth levels is to reduce the saving rate. Like-
wise, the assumption about the presence of downward rigidities 
(non-linearities) in levels of real consumption, where the latter are 
already relatively low, in a setting of persistent declines in income, 
is one of the most plausible explanations for the recent decline in 
the saving rate. Indeed, the disaggregated information at the 
household level available in the Household Expenditure Survey re-
veals that, for households with relatively low levels of income, the 
propensity to increase saving when there is an increase in income 
is low, whereas the tendency to reduce it in the face of a decline in 
income is relatively high (see Panel 4). Thus, inasmuch as a high 
proportion of Spanish households have seen their income fall in 
the past three years, their saving rate and, therefore, the aggregate 
rate for the economy may have shrunk to a disproportionately 
large extent through a non-symmetrical pattern of behaviour such 
as that described.
The breakdown of consumption by type of good (durable and 
non-durable) is also highly illustrative of the possible nature of 
the downward rigidity in total household consumption. Specifi-
cally, the proportion of income earmarked for the consumption of 
non-durable goods, which normally encompass a greater pro-
portion of essential goods than durables do, has increased con-
tinuously since 2010 (see Panel 3). The breakdown of the ratio 
into spending and non-durable goods and income reveals that 
the real consumption of these goods has shown oscillations, in 
both directions, of a limited amount. As a result, the reduction in 
the saving rate from 2010 is partly the outcome of the sustained 
increase in the prices of these goods as a consequence of the 
successive rises seen since then in VAT and in some regulated 
prices (such as electricity, certain public charges and transport 
prices). Also contributing to this has been the squeeze on in-
come, which was particularly telling in 2010, following the rever-
sal of some of the reductions in the tax burden that had been 
adopted in 2008, and in the final stretch of 2012, as a result of 
the greater wage moderation observed recently and of the elimi-
nation of the extra December payment for public-sector employ-
ees that year (see Panel 3).
Hence, from the standpoint of consumption, the main factor posi-
tively influencing the saving rate in the latest phase of the crisis 
has been the strong decline in the real consumption of durable 
goods since the onset of the crisis, with the exception of the tem-
porary rise in the consumption of these goods in the second half 
of 2009 (see Panel 3). The difference in the degree of sensitivity 
between both types of consumption (durable and non-durable) to 
changes in income becomes patent in the dynamic estimations of 
the respective elasticities in Panel 5. Whereas the income elastic-
ity of real non-durable goods consumption has scarcely changed 
in the past decade, spending on durable goods has become nota-
bly more sensitive to fluctuations in household income during the 
crisis period. This latter effect, in turn, might reflect the tightening 
of lending standards applicable to households in recent years, in-
sofar as the consumption of durable goods usually resides to a 
greater extent on the resort to this source of financing. Accord-
ingly, diminished borrowing capacity would entail an increase in 
BOX 5.2SPANISH HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION AND SAVING IN THE LATEST PHASE OF THE CRISIS
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the proportion of spending on durable goods that has to be fi-
nanced by households’ own resources, which would mirror the 
greater sensitivity to income present in the data.
In short, it may be concluded from the foregoing analysis that the 
decline in the Spanish household saving rate in the past three 
years is partly due to weak income and to the dynamism of con-
sumer prices, driven by tax increases and rises in certain regulated 
prices, in a setting in which the strong fall-off in the real consump-
tion of durable goods has run in contrast to the marked stability of 
that of non-durable goods. Foreseeably, the weakness of incomes 
will continue to erode household resources and to diminish their 
saving capacity in the near future, while moderation in the pace of 
inflation, in the absence of further tax rises and against a back-
ground of relatively flat real consumption, should provide for the 
progressive stabilisation of the saving rate.
BOX 5.2SPANISH HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION AND SAVING IN THE LATEST PHASE OF THE CRISIS (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The blue (dark red) bars show the change in the average saving rate per percentile of income from 2006 to 2009 (from 2009 to 2011). Saving rates per household 
have been calculated using Household Expenditure Survey data. 
Revenue and expenditure have been elevated to approximate National Accounts-analogous items and thus correct the under-reporting of revenue and expenditure 
in the Survey.
b See Gerlach and Bachetta (1997), “Consumption and credit constraints: international evidence”, Journal of Monetary Economics.
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The crisis in Spain has been so intense that, since it broke out in 
2008, around 7% of firms have closed1 and employment has fallen 
by 20%. It is, however, important to determine whether these ad-
verse effects at aggregate level have been across-the-board or, on 
the contrary, have been concentrated in certain sectors and/or 
firms and, in particular, whether a certain reallocation of economic 
resources to firms or sectors with higher productivity or potential 
future growth is under way. This Box analyses to what extent the 
crisis is giving rise to a reallocation of productive factors and at-
tempts to characterise the sectors exhibiting a better relative per-
formance since the crisis began. To do this, use was made of the 
financial and economic information available in the Banco de Es-
paña’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office on non-financial corpo-
rations and of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística’s Central Com-
panies Directory (DIRCE), with information to 2011, as well as in-
formation from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, available up to 
2012, in its sectoral breakdown.
Broadly, it can be said that the impact of the crisis is relatively 
uneven across economic sectors. The construction sector, for ex-
ample, has lost 25% of its number of firms and 60% of its jobs 
since 2008, while some non-market services sectors and the en-
ergy and recycling sector have seen net job creation and positive 
employment behaviour since the onset of the crisis. This uneven-
ness in the behaviour of the various economic sectors is the result 
of a reallocation of productive factors across sectors. To approxi-
mate the rate at which this reallocation is occurring, various meas-
ures are used. First, an indicator is constructed to gauge the dis-
persion of the rates of change of employment across economic 
sectors. Chart 1 shows the behaviour of the weighted standard 
deviation of the rates of change of employment across sectors at 
BOX 5.3SECTORAL REALLOCATION SINCE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS
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1  Taking into account both creation and destruction of firms in the period. 
The INE time series of firm demographics starts in 1995, so it contains 
no information on the destruction of firms in the early-1990’s crisis for 
comparison with that of the current crisis. During the economic decel-
eration at the beginning of the 2000s, the stock of firms grew by around 
10% with respect to the stock of firms in 1999.
the two-digit level of disaggregation.2 It can be seen that this dis-
persion remained relatively constant in the cyclical upturns, while 
it increased in the crisis periods, both that of 1993 and that since 
2008. It should be noted, however, that according to this measure, 
the level of sectoral reallocation of employment was higher in the 
early-1990s crisis.
In a second approximation, an accounting decomposition of the 
observed productivity growth is carried out to determine the con-
tribution of the transfer of resources to more productive sectors.3 
In other words, this measure reflects whether the higher-produc-
tivity sectors are the ones gaining weight in the economy, which, 
from an economic standpoint, entails an efficient reallocation of 
resources. As Chart 2 shows, an index of this measure calculated 
using the data of the Central Balance Sheet Data Office shows a 
very stable level throughout the whole expansionary cycle of the 
Spanish economy, which is consistent with the scant vigour of 
productivity observed in that period. However, the value of this 
index increases in 2009 and, above all, in 2011, which may be the 
first sign of a more efficient reallocation of resources in the crisis.4
In addition, to determine which sectors have shown the best rela-
tive performance since the crisis began, Chart 3 plots the growth 
rates between 2008 and 2011 of cumulative gross value added 
(GVA) in nominal terms and of employment, as well as the net cre-
ation of firms for the sub-set of sectors in which value added in-
creased in 2011 with respect to 2008.5 
In this chart a small group of sectors can be discerned whose ac-
tivity indicators performed positively. Most of them belong to the 
services sector, including both non-market services (education, 
health care and social services) and some market services (busi-
ness services, consulting, IT services and transport, among oth-
ers), while in manufacturing the only sub-sectors belonging to this 
category are the manufacture of other transport equipment and 
the manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations. Comparison with European countries shows 
that the economic sectors which have performed best in Spain 
have generally performed equally well in a sub-sample of euro 
area countries in the period analysed.6 This high correlation would 
suggest that, at least partially, the movements between economic 
sectors in Spain and the rest of Europe are being driven by com-
mon trends.
Overall, the various results reported show that, although the crisis 
initiated in 2008 is having extremely negative effects on the num-
ber of firms and employment at aggregate level, there is a certain 
sectoral heterogeneity which reveals that some sectors, services 
in particular, are performing more favourable in terms of activity, 
employment and net creation of firms. Simultaneously, there is 
evidence of a certain sectoral reallocation of productive factors to 
sectors with higher productivity, which, if it continues and extends 
to a larger number of activities, might give rise to higher growth of 
aggregate productivity in the future.
BOX 5.3SECTORAL REALLOCATION SINCE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS (cont’d)
2  Weighted by the share of each sector in total employment. The disag-
gregation corresponds to the two-digit level of the CNAE-93 between 
1987 and 2008 and of the CNAE-2009 thereafter. The unweighted stand-
ard deviation gives similar results.
3  That component of the accounting decomposition of productivity growth 
is called “between term” and in this context has been calculated as the 
covariance between the increase in the weight of a certain sector, meas-
ured in terms of real value added, and its relative productivity. For more 
information, see Haltiwanger, Krizan and Foster (1998), Aggregate Pro-
ductivity Growth: Lessons From Microeconomic Evidence, Working Pa-
pers 98-12, Center for Economic Studies, US Census Bureau.
4  This 2011 figure should be regarded with some caution because the year 
is not yet closed. In particular, it should be taken into account that the 
information for 2001 was based on 180,000 firms, compared with more 
than 300,000 for 2010.
5  These sectors are the two-digit disaggregation of the CNAE-2009. Fi-
nancial and insurance activities have been excluded.
6  This sub-sample includes Germany, France, Italy and Portugal in the 
case of GVA, and France, Italy and Portugal in the case of employment. 
The information source is the BACH database.
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Recent developments in lending to non-financial corporations 
suggest that institutions in a situation of greater weakness have 
stricter lending policies.1 In addition, the approval of the adjust-
ment plans of institutions that have received public funds from the 
FROB obliges them to reduce their volume of lending further over 
the next five years. This raises the question of the extent to which 
firms that were, at the start of the financial crisis, obtaining fund-
ing from such banks are being adversely affected as a result and 
how far they are able to replace the financing they no longer re-
ceive from these institutions with funds obtained from other, more 
solid institutions.
To answer these questions, this box uses Central Credit Register 
(CIR) data to analyse developments in the lending of different institu-
tions to non-financial corporations, distinguishing between banks in 
a weaker situation (hereinafter “banks under restructuring”)2 and 
BOX 6.1AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF CREDIT ACROSS INSTITUTIONS 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The 2012 data correspond to November.
b Banco CAM, Catalunya Banc, NCG Banco, Unimm Banc, Banco Gallego, Banco Valencia and BFA Group.
c? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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1  See the article “Un análisis de las diferencias entre entidades en la 
evolución del crédito al sector privado durante la crisis”, in the March 
2013 issue of the Economic Bulletin of the Banco de España.
2  These are considered to be those taken over or controlled by the FROB 
at some time during the period of recent years up to end-2012. Spe-
cifically, they are the following: Banco CAM (taken over in July 2011 
and subsequently sold to B. Sabadell, which absorbed it in December 
2012), Catalunya Banc, NCG Banco, Unimm Banc and Banco Gallego 
(majority-controlled by the FROB since September 2011, as a result of 
capital injections made by the latter; Banco Gallego is indirectly con-
trolled, as it is a subsidiary of NCG Banco; Unimm Banc was subse-
quently sold to BBVA but had still not been absorbed by the latter as at 
the end of 2012), Banco de Valencia (taken over in November 2011 and 
sold to Caixabank in February 2013) and the BFA group (controlled by 
the FROB since May 2012).
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other institutions. Panel 1 shows how the former have indeed been 
cutting their financing to non-financial corporations more sharply 
over the last two and a half years than other institutions. Between 
December 2010 and November 2012,3 the fall recorded by these 
institutions was 18%, as against 12% in the case of other institu-
tions. In this case, moreover, the evolution of loans did not follow the 
cyclical pattern of those granted by the rest of the system in 2009 
and 2010, which was more in line with the specific dynamics of the 
economy. This would suggest that their fund granting policy was more 
influenced by other types of factors, less linked to the business cycle.
Nonetheless, to assess the extent to which this has entailed a con-
straint for “dependent firms” (defined as those that in December 
2010 had funds lent by banks under restructuring) it is necessary 
to take into account the possible effects of substitution between 
institutions. Panel 2 shows, for dependent firms, the distribution of 
the change between the two dates mentioned, of total bank cred-
it received and of that granted by the banks under restructuring 
only.4 The difference observed reflects the fact that some of these 
firms have replaced all or part of the funds granted by the latter 
banks with loans from other institutions.
However, a certain degree of substitution is normal in a market in 
which banks compete among themselves to attract customers. 
The question is whether this process has occurred fluidly, so that 
firms dependent on banks that have cut their supply of credit 
most have not faced a greater constraint than those that received 
financing from more solid institutions. To analyse this an equa-
tion is estimated relating the change in total credit received by 
non-financial firms, between December 2010 and November 
2012, to its main determinants (size of the company, date of in-
corporation, sector, and indicators of its financial situation, in-
cluding the level of its indebtedness, profitability, sales growth, 
employment and bad debts in 2010).5 The inclusion in this re-
gression of a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for de-
pendent firms  enables us to determine the extent to which such 
firms have recorded credit behaviour significantly different from 
that of the rest. With all the necessary caveats,6 the results show 
that these firms  recorded 2.5% lower growth in their total bank 
lending than equivalent firms that were not financed by  banks 
under restructuring. This would seem to imply that the substitu-
tion has not been perfect and, therefore this evidence suggests 
that the existence of distressed banks has adverse implications 
for the real economy.7
To illustrate the quantitative relevance of shifts between institu-
tions, Panel 3 shows three measures of the (median) decline in 
credit at dependent firms: the decline in credit from banks under 
restructuring; the decline in total funds received; and the decline 
that these firms would have had, according to the estimated 
equation, if they had not depended on these banks (theoretical 
credit). Comparison of the first two measures indicates that there 
has actually been a certain degree of substitution of lending insti-
tutions by the companies. Comparison of the latter two measures 
(total credit and theoretical credit) indicates that this substitution 
was not complete, although it was substantial. The aggregate 
substitution ratio, defined as the ratio between, on one hand, the 
median fall in total credit less that in credit from  banks under re-
structuring (which measures the substituted part) and, on the 
other hand, the fall in theoretical credit less that in credit from 
these banks (which measures the need for substitution), has a 
value of 65%. It should be taken into account that this measure 
reflects shifts arising from both changes in the lending policy of 
the usual lender and from autonomous decisions that may have 
been taken by the firm itself. 
Panel 4 shows these three measures of decline in credit and the 
substitution ratio again, for different groupings of firms. The de-
gree of substitution is higher in sectors other than construction 
and real-estate services (category 3), for large companies (cat-
egory 7) and for companies less than 20% of whose total credit 
came from  banks under restructuring (category 8).8 This is con-
sistent with the fact that, either because they are large, or be-
cause they already had significant operations with other banks 
or belong to a sector less affected by the crisis than construc-
tion and real-estate services, these firms posed fewer informa-
tion asymmetry problems for banks. In any case, in all the 
groupings considered there is a positive difference between the 
fall in total financing obtained by dependent firms and the de-
cline that would have occurred, according to the estimated 
model, given their characteristics and economic situation. That 
is to say, in all cases the substitution is only partial and there is 
a negative effect arising from dependence on institutions under 
restructuring, which varies from 0.8 percentage points (pp), for 
the largest firms (category 7), to 4.6 pp for firms 20-80% of 
whose initial credit was from such institutions.
BOX 6.1AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF CREDIT ACROSS INSTITUTIONS (cont’d)
3  The November 2012 data are used instead of the December data to 
avoid the analysis being affected by the transfer of loans of Group 1 in-
stitutions to the SAREB, which took place in December 2012.
4  The definition of credit used in this box includes both drawn-down and 
undrawn balances, and both those maintained on the balance sheet and 
those written off, in line with the analysis of the article mentioned above 
in Footnote 1. This variable is considered a better measure of the change 
in the supply of funds to firms.
5  For this exercise, the CIR data are matched with the integrated data of the 
Central Balance Sheet Data Office of the Banco de España, which include 
the data obtained from its annual survey (CBA) and from the mercantile 
registries. The final sample analysed comprises 285,000 firms, of which 
around 68,000 had credit from taken-over banks in December 2010.
6  Despite the attempt to control for all possible relevant factors, the fit of 
the regression is poor and although the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant and have the expected signs, it is 
not possible to rule out entirely that part of the difference attributed to 
the dependence on banks under pressure is actually a result of other 
determinants that were not included.
7  This would be in line with the results of Jiménez et al (2012): “Credit 
Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet 
Channel with Loan Applications”, American Economic Review, 102(5): 
2301-2326.
8  In the construction and real-estate sectors (category 2), the ratio is actu-
ally negative, since total lending was reduced by slightly more than that 
granted by banks under restructuring (15.4% as against 14.8%).
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BOX 6.1AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF CREDIT ACROSS INSTITUTIONS (cont’d)
In short, the evidence presented in this box suggests that, in 
general, Spanish firms dependent on institutions under re-
structuring would have been able to replace, to a significant 
degree, the funds that they no longer received from their usual 
lenders with financing from other, more solid institutions. 
However, the scope of this substitution process depends on 
the characteristics of the firms, so that the existence of dis-
tressed institutions has certain constraining effects in the 
short term on the access of non-financial corporations to bank 
credit, although in the medium term the restructuring of such 
institutions will facilitate the normalisation of financing in the 
economy.
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BOX 6.2CORPORATE LENDING BY BANKS SINCE THE ONSET OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. 
A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Calculations made using information from the Central Credit Register.
b Calculations based on a combination of information from the Central Credit Register and the Central Balance Sheet Data ???????Firms with ?xed-income issues 
are excluded. 
c Average of the percentages for each sector.
d Return on assets, de?ned as (ordinary net pro?t + ?nancial costs) / net assets.
e Debt ratio, de?ned as interest-bearing borrowing / net assets.
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The financial accounts of the Spanish economy reflect a slow and 
progressive decline in the debt of non-financial corporations over the 
last few years. According to this information, there was a cumulative 
fall of 12.1% in this sector’s debt from its 2009 peak to end-2012. 
This is explained mainly by the behaviour of bank credit, which is the 
main form of financing available to firms, especially smaller ones. 
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BOX 6.2CORPORATE LENDING BY BANKS SINCE THE ONSET OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. 
A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS (cont’d)
This Box analyses that process of deleveraging from a microeco-
nomic standpoint to see whether it has been uniform across firms.
Chart 1, which is based on Central Credit Register (CCR) data on 
drawn credit, reveals that the contraction since 2009 has been 
compatible every year with a considerable positive flow of financ-
ing in some firms.1 The increase in credit recorded for the firms in 
this situation, in an adverse economic setting characterised by 
tight financing conditions, has naturally been smaller than in the 
more expansionary years, although it has held at notable levels, 
close to 9% of the GDP of those years.
Analysis of this phenomenon in terms of the number of firms shows 
that since the crisis broke out in 2008 the percentage of firms 
which raised (or did not change) their bank financing has fallen 
each year, despite which it remained at a notable level – around 
40% – for nearly all economic sectors (see Chart 2). There were, 
however, some sectors in which the decrease was sharper, such as 
construction and real estate activities which were harder hit by the 
crisis, and energy, where the percentage dropped rapidly to stand 
at 25% in 2012. The decrease in the energy sector is explained by 
the deleveraging of some of the main energy groups in recent 
years2 and by the significant reduction of renewable energy pro-
jects from 2008 after the sharp expansion of previous years.
Chart 3, prepared by combining information from the CCR and 
from the Integrated Central Balance Sheet Data Office survey 
(CBI),3 shows how, in the most recent period, despite the reces-
sionary economic situation, the bank debt of a significant per-
centage of firms has continued to grow, both in the small firms 
segment and among the largest firms. However, small firms, 
harder hit by the economic crisis and faced with tighter financ-
ing conditions, have shown lower percentages throughout the 
period. 
In the other charts (Charts 4, 5 and 6), the firms in which bank 
credit remained steady or increased are compared with those at 
which it decreased. To carry out this economic and financial com-
parison, three significant variables in this area were selected: re-
turn on assets, debt and sales.4 It can be deduced from these 
charts that the firms whose bank financing moved upwards were, 
on average, more profitable, had lower debt and enjoyed more 
buoyant sales. Moreover, in the case of the debt ratio, the gap 
between the average levels of the two groups has widened sig-
nificantly. Thus, while in 2008 the difference was scarcely 7 pp, in 
2012 the firms with a zero or positive change in credit had average 
debt of 48.1%, nearly 18 pp lower than that of those whose debt 
decreased (66%).
The results of this Box show that the recent behaviour of finan-
cial debt in the business sector has been extremely uneven. Al-
though in aggregate terms the last few years have been domi-
nated by deleveraging processes, the percentage of firms whose 
bank financing has increased in this period has not been negli-
gible. This phenomenon was apparent in most productive sec-
tors, both in small firms and in large ones. The firms whose bor-
rowing grew are characterised, on average, by a healthier finan-
cial position, higher profitability and more buoyant activity. 
These developments thus suggest that available resources are 
gradually being reallocated to the firms and sectors in a com-
paratively better economic and financial situation. This reduces 
the risk of the sector as a whole.
1  All analyses have been made using CCR information on drawn credit. 
The main conclusions do not change if total undrawn credit is used.
2  For more details, see the box on this matter in the article “Results of 
non-financial corporations to 2012 Q4 and summary year-end data”, 
published in the March 2013 Economic Bulletin.
3  The CBI is a sample obtained by combining the Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office annual survey and the CBB database (based on Mercantile 
Register information). Firms with fixed-income securities issues were ex-
cluded from the analysis (between 50 and 80 firms, depending on the 
year), since bank credit is not the only source of financing for these firms.
4  The return on assets and debt figures are shown up to 2012, since they 
refer to the previous period. As regards sales, the 2012 rate of change is 
not given because the 2012 sales figure is not yet available.
